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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2) (j) pursuant

to an Order

of the

Utah Supreme Court entered November 1, 2010.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
POINT I.

Appeal of the Judgment and Underlying Orders is
Properly Before This Court.

POINT II.

Under the Clear and Unambiguous Terms of the
ME&LS Operating Agreement, Dale Bennett Did Not
Terminate His Employment with the Company
(ME&LS) So Is Still a Member of ME&LS.

POINT III.

The Relevant Language of the Operating
Agreement Is Not Ambiguous and the Intentions
of the Parties Are Clear from a Plain Reading
of the Operating Agreement.

POINT IV.

Plaintiffs' Position Ignores the Clear Language
of the Operating Agreement and Unnecessarily
Relies on Irrelevant Facts Outside the
Operating Agreement.

POINT V.

Proper Construction of the Clear Language of
the Operating Agreement Does Not Lead to Absurd
Results or to Nullification of its Terms.
v

POINT VI.

Plaintiffs1 Attempt to Restructure the
Operating Agreement, Without Notice to Bennett,
Is Invalid and a Violation of Judge Boyden1s
Previously Announced Order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiffs filed this suit, claiming, among other
things, that the resignation of Dale K. Bennett
as

an

"employee"

automatically
"member"
("ME&LS").

of

of

McNeil

constituted
McNeil

a

Engineering,
"withdrawal"

Engineering

&

Land

("Bennett")

Inc.
by

("MEI")

him

as

Surveying,

a

LLC

Following briefing and argument on the parties'

Cross-Motions

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment,

Judge

Ann

Boyden ruled that Bennett remains a member of ME&LS and is
entitled to all of the benefits of a member.

Plaintiffs'

Motion to Reconsider was denied by Judge Pat Brian.
Thereafter the District Court, Judge Brian, entered a
Judgment

in

favor

of

Bennett

for

Bennett's

unpaid

percentage share of ME&LS distributions for 2005 and 2006.
This Court held that the judgment had not been properly
certified for appeal and the first appeal was dismissed.
Upon remand ME&LS filed a Motion to Revise Orders and
Judgment that was denied by Judge Dever.
vi

Also upon remand,

Bennett

filed

his

Motion

to

Enforce

Judgment

that

was

granted.
Thereafter

Bennett

filed

a Motion

for

Certification,

joined in by ME&LS, that Judge Boyden's judgment is final
for purposes of Rule 54(b) and for appeal that was granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Scott

F.

formed

McNeil

("MEI") in 1983, and since has been the

Engineering, Inc.
sole owner of MEI.

MEI

("McNeil")

McNeil

(R.1168)

2.

Upon its formation, Bennett became an employee of

and

remained

an

employee

of MEI

from

1983

until

he

resigned as an employee of that company on August 17, 2005.
(R.1187; R.6630)
3.

In

companies

1996,

McNeil

associated

and surveying

formed

with MEI

three

limited

to perform

the

liability
engineering

services to its clients theretofore

on by MEI itself.

carried

ME&LS was one of the three LLCs created.

(R.1169-1170, 1173; R.6627)
4.
leased

MEI
them

(R.1178)
its staff

remained
to

the

ME&LS

employer

and

to

the

of

all

other

personnel
two

and

companies.

MEI also provided administrative services through
employees

for

all

of the

vii

companies.

(R.1175-

1177; R.6628)

MEI has provided no engineering or surveying

services since 1996.
5.

(R.1174)

Bennett became a 25% member owner of ME&LS at its

inception in 1996 and thereafter rendered services on ME&LS
projects as a leased "employee" of and for MEI.

(R.6628)

In 2005 Bennett owned 252 shares for a total of 26.53% of
the membership interest in ME&LS.
6.

Both McNeil and Bennett were members and managers,

but never employees, of ME&LS.
has

(R.6618)

never

had

any

(R.6601)

employees.

All

In fact, ME&LS

services

on

ME&LS

projects were provided to ME&LS by leased employees of MEI
working for MEI, not for ME&LS, on work of ME&LS.

(R.1178;

R.6628, emphasis added.)
7.

Both

McNeil

and

Bennett

understood

beginning that Bennett was an employee of MEI.

from

the

(R.1175;

R.5445)
8.

MEI

provided

and

paid

for

all

of

the

services

required of an employer to all of its employees, including
Bennett.
salary,
internet,

(R.5444-5445)
bonuses,

These

insurance,

telephone,

included

office,

automobile

association membership, etc.
viii

things

such

secretarial
and

as

help,

professional

9.

An Amendment No. 2, dated November 1, 2001, to the

Operating

Agreement

("Operating

Agreement")

of

ME&LS

provided in Sec 12.1 that a member
"shall cease to be a member
withdrawal of a member,"

.

.

. upon

the

and in Section 12.3 that
"a member shall be deemed to withdraw when the
member
voluntarily
resigns
or terminates the
member' s employment with the Company for reasons
or
other
than
bankruptcy,
death,
disability
incompetence." (R.6618-21, emphasis added.)
10.

Under

definitions

of

the

ME&LS

Operating

Agreement, in Section 1.10, the "Company" is defined as
"McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, L.C., a
liability company formed under the laws of Utah,
and any successor company."
Id.
11.

MEI

is

not

referred

to

in

either

the

ME&LS

Operating Agreement or in Amendment No. 1 or Amendment No.
2, nor is there any definition of "employment," "employee"
or "withdrawal."

There is also no reference to the term

"leased employee."
12.
McNeil
MEI.

On August 17, 2005, Bennett submitted a letter to
stating

that he was resigning his employment

(R.2600-2601)

Bennett did nothing to withdraw from,

sell or otherwise give up his valuable ownership
in ME&LS.

with

interest

Nor was there any reason why he should do so.
ix

13. In August, 2006, the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment on Bennett's status as a member of
ME&LS and his rights, if any, as a member.

(R. 2510-2581;

R.2585-2644)
14. On November

17, 2006,

Judge

Boyden

ruled

that

Bennett is still a member of ME&LS and is entitled to:
"All of the rights of a member, including, for
example, the same right to current information,
accounting, disbursements, and other benefits that
any other member of ME&LS is entitled to receive."
(R.3119-22)

That ruling was confirmed by Judge Boyden's

Order dated December 21, 2006.

Id.

15. None of the documents related to ME&LS had ever
referred to MEI until an Amendment No. 4 was purportedly
adopted unilaterally on November 29, 2006, without notice
to or approval of Bennett, just twelve days after Judge
Boyden's ruling on November 17, 2006.

(R.5772-75)

16. Amendment No. 4 is a clear attempt to overrule and
void Judge Boyden's Order.

Amendment No. 4 omitted Bennett

as a member and his membership interest was transferred to
McNeil and the other members of ME&LS without consideration
to Bennett.

17.

Appellants

filed

a

motion

to

reconsider

Judge

Boyden's Order which was denied by Judge Brian on April 2,
2008.

(R.6791-6793)

18.
members
paid

During the year 2005, ME&LS made distributions to
totaling

out

$320,136.10.

quarterly.
paid,

These

In January
and

Bennett

distributions

2005,
was

were

a distribution

paid

$26,526.32,

of

$100,000

was

or

26.53%.

In April 2005, a distribution of $90,000 was paid

and Bennett was paid $23,873.68, or 26.53%.

In September

2005, a distribution of $30,136.10 was paid.

In November

2005, a distribution of $100,000 was paid.
paid

his

share

distributions.

of

either

the

Bennett was not

September

or

November

(See Yearly General Ledger Detail Report.

Bates numbered ME 0009934, attached as Exhibit 2.) (R.64326433)
19.
members

During the year 2006, ME&LS made distributions to
totaling

distribution

of

$405,740.40.

$105,740.40

In

February

was paid.

distribution

of

$90,000

was

distribution

of

$100,000

was

paid.
paid.

distribution of $100,000 was paid.

xi

In April
In
In

July
October

2006,

a

2006, a
2005,

a

2005,

a

Bennett was not paid

his share of any of the distributions paid to all the other
Id.

members during 2 006.
20.

In January, 2007, Bennett filed a Motion for Order

of Judgment

seeking an order requiring payment to him of

his unpaid share of ME&LS distributions for 2005 and 2006
in the amount of $142,974.42.
21.
motion

On December
subject

Bennett

had

21, 2006,

only

to

received

an
and

Id.

(R.6432-6435)
Judge Boyden

accounting
what

as

he

granted

that

what

funds

to

had

not

received.

(R.6421-6427)
22.

On

argument,

April

Judge

3,

2008,

Brian

following

entered

an

briefing

Order

and

and

oral

Judgment

in

favor of Bennett in the amount of $142,174.93, representing
Bennett's share of unpaid distributions
The

Court

also

found

that

there

was

in 2005 and 2006.

no

just

reason

for

delaying entry of the judgment and certified the judgment
as final.
23.
Court

(R.6791-6793)
ME&LS

dismissed

filed
the

its first Notice of Appeal

and this

appeal

properly

because

it

was

certified as final for purposes of appeal.
Court of Appeals Decision.)

xii

not

(Attachment 1 -

24.

Thereafter,

Bennett

filed

his

Motion

for

Certification, joined in by ME&LS, that Judge Brian's Order
and Judgment

on April

appeal

that

and

(Attachment

2

-

3, 2008 was

was

granted

Order

Granting

final

on

for purposes of

October

19,

Certification,

2010.

including

findings.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
During

the time Bennett was an employee

of MEI

from

1996 until he resigned as an employee on August 17, 2005,
MEI provided to him all of the services and support usually
provided by an employer to its employees.
Bennett has never been an employee of ME&LS.
provided no employer
fact, ME&LS, as

ME&LS has

support or services to Bennett.

structured

by McNeil, has

never

had

In
any

employees.
McNeil's

contention

that

Bennett's

status

and

termination of employment as an "employee of MEI" somehow
automatically
ME&LS"

is

reasonable

a

constitutes
forced

and

interpretation

Operating Agreement.

his

"withdrawal

strained
of

as

construction

the

terms

of

a member

of

beyond

any

the

ME&LS

Bennett's work was performed for, and

as an employee of MEI, on tasks MEI undertook for ME&LS.
xiii

Three

judges

following

of the

District

full briefing

occasions,

that

the

and

Court properly

argument

ME&LS

on

Operating

three

ruled,

separate

Agreement

is

unambiguous and that Bennett remains a member of ME&LS.
The

District

Court

properly

entered

the

Order

and

Judgment in the amount of unpaid member distributions for
2005 and 2006 because McNeil did not have a right to offset
uncertain,
against

unproven,

the

disputed

distributions

and

Bennett

unliquidated
should

have

claims

received.

The District Court's second determination that there was no
just reason for delay was proper under the facts of this
case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT AND UNDERLYING ORDERS IS
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.

This appeal is taken by ME&LS from both the Judgment
and the underlying Orders of 2010, December 21, 2006, April
2, 2008, and October 19, 2010.

The Judgment was certified

as final upon remand under Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure

by

the

District

Court,

and

it

was

determined that "there is no just reason for delay."
This second appeal meets the three requirements set' out
by the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott
1

Corp.

v.

Utah

State

Tax

Comm'n,

814

P.2d

1099,

1101

(Utah

1991),

decision of this Court in the prior appeal.

and

the

First, there

are "multiple claims for relief" by "multiple parties" to
this

action.

entered would

Second,

"the

Judgment

and

certification

otherwise have been appealable

absent the

other claims," and the District Court made a determination
"that there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal.
POINT II.

UNDER THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF THE
ME&LS OPERATING AGREEMENT, DALE BENNETT DID NOT
TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY
(ME&LS) SO IS STILL A MEMBER OF ME&LS.

Under the unambiguous wording of the ME&LS Operating
Agreement, in order to withdraw as a member, Bennett had to
resign his "employment" with or withdraw from ME&LS.

The

unwarranted interpretation plaintiffs attempt to apply to
the ME&LS Operating Agreement
simple meaning of its terms.

contradicts

The undisputed facts are that

Bennett was never employed by ME&LS.
any employees.
separate
asking

and
the

the plain and

ME&LS has never had

He resigned his employment from a totally
independent

Court

to

company,

ignore

the

MEI.
plain

Plaintiffs
language

of

are
the

Operating Agreement and rule that upon his resignation from
MEI he withdrew
entity.

from ME&LS which is a wholly different

This transparent attempt to apply terms of the
2

ME&LS Operating Agreement to MEI is without support in any
documents related to either of these entities.
Because Dale Bennett was not employed by and did not
resign employment from ME&LS, his membership interests and
ownership rights in ME&LS could not have been affected by
his August 2005 resignation from MEI under the very clear
and carefully

crafted provisions of the ME&LS Operating

Agreement or under the provisions of any document related
to MEI.

Plaintiffs' argument would require the Court to

ignore the plain language of the Operating Agreement.
ME&LS is a manager-managed limited liability company.
Its members include Bennett, McNeil and four other persons.
MEI is, and always has been, owned solely by McNeil.
ME&LS Operating Agreement
this company.
defines

Section

"Company"

Surveying."

This

as

is the governing

1.10

document for

of the Operating Agreement

"McNeil

definition

The

Engineering
is

question of law before the Court.

and

determinative

of

Land
the

Plaintiffs want the

Court to overlook this very clear definition and create,
then import into the Operating Agreement, provisions that
have no basis in fact, or in usual or customary use, or in
any document related to either of these entities.
3

Those

documents crafted by McNeil say what they say and are not
subject

to manipulation

by

McNeil

to

suit

his

present

interests.
The parties

do not

dispute

that

the provisions

of

Amendment No. 2 to the ME&LS Operating Agreement pertaining
to the dissociation of a member govern Bennett's membership
status in ME&LS.

It is also uncontested that under Section

12.1 of Amendment No. 2, a person ceases to be a member if
that member terminates employment or withdraws as a member.
Section 12.3 (a) provides:
"For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be
deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily
resigns or terminates the Member's employment with
the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy,
death, disability or incompetency."
(Emphasis

added.)

However,

at

no

time

has

terminated or withdrawn as a member of ME&LS.

Bennett

His status

and his role as a member and manager of ME&LS must not be
confused with his role as an employee of MEI.
POINT III. THE RELEVANT LANGUAGE OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THE INTENTIONS OF THE
PARTIES ARE CLEAR FROM A PLAIN READING OF THE
OPERATING AGREEMENT.
The

interpretation

examination
Authority

v.

of
Salt

the

of

a

contract

See

contract" itself.

Lake

City

Southern
4

begins

R.R.

with

Utah

Co.,

Inc.,

the

Transit
2006

UT App 46, 131 P.3d 288 ("When interpreting a contract, a
court

first

determine

looks

to

the

the

contract's

parties

four

intentions,

corners
which

controlling.")(quotations and citations omitted));
Square

Associates

v.

App. 1994) (same).

Nielson,

886 P. 2d

61, 63

to
are

Trolley

(Utah Ct.

"If the contract is in writing and its

language is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions should
Turner

be determined from the words of the agreement."
Hi-Country

Homeowners

Association,

(Utah 1996); see also

ELM, Inc.

968

Ct. App.

P.2d

861

(Utah

910 P.2d
v.

M.T.

v.

1223, 1225-26

Enterprises,

1998)(holding

Inc.,

that

if a

contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must
construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary
meaning).

"When the contract is not ambiguous, the court

may not look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the
terms

M.D.,

Uintah

therein,"

Basin

Medical

Center

v.

Hardy,

2005 UT App 92, 110 P.3d 168.
Section 12.3(a) of the ME&LS Operating Agreement is not

ambiguous.
not

The plain and ordinary meaning of its terms are

contested

member,

here.

paragraph

To

constitute

12.3(a).

requires

a withdrawal
that

the

as a
member

voluntarily resign or terminate his employment with "the
5

Company."

This provision

could

arguably be ambiguous

if

the term "Company" was not a defined term in the Operating
Agreement.

"Company", however, is defined only as McNeil

Engineering and Land Surveying.

Therefore, the "plain and

ordinary meaning" of the terms are that in order to be a
withdrawing member, the member must voluntarily resign or
terminate his employment with ME&LS.
happened

in this

case because

employee of ME&LS.

That simply has never

Bennett

has never been

an

He has not resigned or terminated an

employment he has never had nor has he withdrawn so there
could have been no effect on his membership.
Bennett

stated

in

his

August

17,

2005

letter

of

resignation, "I therefore resign as an employee of McNeil
Engineering, Inc."

Thus, Bennett was always employed by,

and only resigned his employment from MEI, not from ME&LS.
A plain and simple

interpretation

of the ME&LS

Operating

Agreement is that Dale Bennett is still a member of ME&LS
because he has not withdrawn as a member pursuant to the
clearly defined

terms of the Operating Agreement

letter of resignation.

6

and his

POINT IV.

PLAINTIFFS' POSITION IGNORES THE CLEAR LANGUAGE
OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND UNNECESSARILY
RELIES ON IRRELEVANT FACTS OUTSIDE THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT.

Plaintiffs
meaning
conclude

of

ask the Court

the

that

terms

Bennett

of
is

to

the
no

look beyond

Operating

longer

the plain

Agreement

a member

and

of ME&LS

because his August 17, 2005 "'resignation" from MEI was "in
effect" also

a "withdrawal" from ME&LS.

This

strained

attempt to write new and wholly unsupported terms into the
ME&LS Operating Agreement
Transit

Authority,

is patently wrong.

See

Utah

2006 UT App 46 at 5 12 (stating that to

merit consideration, an alternative interpretation must be
based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language
used and may not be the result of a forced or strained
construction).
Plaintiffs'

argument

cannot

succeed

because

they

attempt to interpret the Operating Agreement using terms
that are nowhere found within it.

MEI, Bennett's employer,

is not mentioned anywhere in the ME&LS Operating Agreement.
Bennett's resignation from MEI can have no impact on his
ownership interests in ME&LS.

Bennett's membership rights

in ME&LS stand separate and apart from his status as an
employee of MEI.
7

The fact that Bennett was one of many employees leased
by MEI to ME&LS is immaterial to the question before the
Court.

Because Bennett was employed by MEI, he could have

been leased to any or all of the three McNeil LLCs, or he
could have remained as an employee of MEI itself, or ME&LS
could have leased employees
company.

To

relevant

to

the

Agreement.
to-day

whom

MEI

from another employee

chose

to

interpretation

lease

of

the

Bennett
ME&LS

leasing
is

not

Operating

Plaintiffs' argument that Bennett's close day-

association

with ME&LS

somehow

changed

his

actual

employment status and therefore the meaning of the express
terms

of

the

Operating

Plaintiffs

are

distorting

Agreement
the

must

be

undisputed

rejected.

facts

about

Bennett's employment in order to deprive him of his right
as a member of ME&LS.
POINT V.

PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE
OPERATING AGREEMENT DOES NOT LEAD TO ABSURD
RESULTS OR TO NULLIFICATION OF ITS TERMS.

Plaintiffs
12.3

of

the

claim

Operating

that

any

interpretation

Agreement,

other

than

of

Section

their

own,

would necessarily "nullify" its terms and lead to "absurd"
results.

A review of that section, however, demonstrates

8

that

such

is not

the

case.

Section

12.3 provides

in

material part that:
"A member shall be deemed to withdraw when the
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the
member's employment with the Company . . ."
To begin with, ME&LS and the other two companies had
the ability, never invoked, to hire employees of their own
to perform
performed
employment

the
by

same

leased

clearly

services

as those

employees

of MEI.

would

have

that were being
Thus

application

the word
had

ME&LS

decided, or should it at some point decide, to hire its own
employees.

The

word

termination

cannot

be

applied

to

Bennett as a member or as a manager of ME&LS because he did
not either voluntarily resign or terminate as to ME&LS.
His

only

termination

was

different entity, MEI.

as an employee

from a wholly

Thus, plaintiffs' claim that his

resignation as an employee of MEI triggered his withdrawal
from ME&LS is nonsensical.
Plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge the simple fact that
under usual, accepted and customary business practice, the
role, rights and duties of an "employee" of a corporation
differ markedly

from the

"member" of an LLC.

role, rights

and

duties

of a

Plaintiffs do not want to recognize
9

that under usual and customary practice, the resignation of
an

"employee"

from

a

corporation

has

no

effect

on

the

employee's position as a "member" of a clearly distinct and
different

entity,

an

that

under

acknowledge

LLC.
the

Plaintiffs
usual

and

also

refuse

customary

to

business

practices, employees of an employee leasing company do not
become employees of the company that leases their services
from their employer simply because services for the leasing
company's

client

are

leased employees.

provided

by

the

leasing

company's

This is so even though these

benefit their employer's client.

services

Nor is there a limitation

on the kinds, quality, or volume of work a leased employee
can perform for his employer's clients.
It
lease

is a simple
their

fact

employees

that
to

employee

perform

leasing

services

companies
for

their

employer on work undertaken for clients of their employer,
often

at

employees
services

the
of

client's
a given

for multiple

place
leasing
clients.

of

business.

company
That

often

And

leased

perform

such

fact does not make

them employees of each of the leasing company's clients.
As applied to this case, that relationship has existed
where Bennett, as an employee of MEI, the employee leasing
10

company, directed

the work of MEI's

perform

for MEI

the

work

on

projects of MEI's client, ME&LS.

other

engineering

employees to
and

surveying

The work of both Bennett

and the other MEI employees was for their employer MEI who
was by that means meeting its obligation to perform on
projects

of

its client, ME&LS.

employees of ME&LS.

That

didn't make

them

Under plaintiffs' construction, where

a leasing company's leased employees worked on different
projects for multiple clients it would make them employees
of each such client.

That result would indeed be absurd.

And if, as plaintiffs claim, Bennett became the employee of
ME&LS, was he also at the same time still an employee of
MEI?

That result would also be absurd.
The case Pro-Benefit Staffing,

111

P.2d

1110

Inc.

v.

Board

of

Review,

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), cited by ME&LS, is

highly instructive under the facts of the present case to
confirm that ME&LS was not the employer of Bennett.
In that case, Pro-Benefit Staffing merely
. . . calculated the client's payroll, cut checks
for wages and taxes drawn on its account and
delivered paychecks to client for distribution to
employees in return for a check from client for
amount of payroll plus its fee and which
designated owner of client business as "on-site"
supervisor, lacked requisite decision-making power
to qualify as an "employer".
11

Id.

In the present case, it cannot be truthfully

claimed

that "the requisite decision-making power to qualify as an
employer did not in fact rest in MEI and its sole owner,
Scott McNeil."
In that case
[t]he net result of the formal maneuvering via the
contract between Pro-Benefit and the Client is
little different, as a practical matter, from the
situation that existed before Pro-Benefit became
involved, except that Pro-Benefit handles payroll,
employee benefits, and a few other personnelrelated administrative matters.

As noted supra, the employment arrangements after the
reorganization in 1996 did not change the arrangement that
had existed since 1983 wherein MEI and Scott McNeil had and
exercised all decision making authority.
The Court there concluded:
Applying those factors to this case, it is
apparent that Pro-Benefit lacks the requisite
decision-making power to qualify as an employer.
The supervision by Pro-Benefit is, as the appeal
referee found, merely the "facade of control." The
"on-site supervisor" designated by Pro-Benefit is
the Client's owner or manager, who does not look
to Pro-Benefit for instructions in running the
business or even communicate with Pro-Benefit,
except to notify Pro-Benefit of information needed
to perform administrative and clerical functions.
As a practical matter, it is the Client's owner or
12

manager who performs all of the following elements
of the employer's role:
1.

Directs the work and specifies the manner and
method of accomplishing it.

2.

Trains
work.

3.

Determines if, when, and which employees will
be hired, dismissed, or laid off.

4.

Determines rates of pay and the availability
of employee benefits.

5.

Assigns tasks;
vacations.

6.

Directs and leads the employees in the general
conduct of the Client's business activities.

the

employees

in how

schedules

to perform

hours

of

work

the

and

These elements describe the role and authority of MEI
and McNeil in the present case.
POINT VI.

It
material

PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO RESTRUCTURE THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT, WITHOUT NOTICE TO BENNETT, IS INVALID
AND A VIOLATION OF JUDGE BOYDEN'S PREVIOUSLY
ANNOUNCED ORDER.
is

significant

facts

does

not

that

plaintiffs'

include

or

even

statement
refer

to

of

ME&LS

Amendment No. 4 that was adopted November 29, 2006, without
notice to Bennett.

That Amendment purports to eliminate

Bennett's membership interest and apportion the same among
McNeil and the other members

of ME&LS.

This attempt to

write off and appropriate Bennett's membership came after,
and was in direct violation of, Judge Boyden's ruling.
13

Within

twelve

(12)

days

following

Judge

Boyden's

ruling, and in clear violation of the terms and effect of
that ruling, McNeil deliberately proceeded, unilaterally,
and without

any notice

to the Court or to Bennett, to

retroactively

restructure

the

terminate

appropriate

Bennett's

and

Operating

Agreement

valuable

to

membership

interest.
Without permission of the Court on the very matter that
was pending before the Court for resolution, and without
notice

to

Bennett,

plaintiffs

added

new

terms

to

the

Operating Agreement to accomplish what the Court had denied
and what they have claimed was already provided
Agreement before that amendment was adopted.
truly

believed

their

interpretation

of

in the

If plaintiffs
the

Operating

Agreement was valid, they would not have needed to provide
in Amendment No. 4 what they claim was already provided
under the existing terms of the Operating Agreement.

These

actions show contempt for Judge Boyden's ruling and also
demonstrate the lengths to which McNeil will go to damage
Bennett financially.
Rather than show respect for the Court's ruling and
pursue a proper course to seek a reversal, the plaintiffs,
14

unilaterally

and

without

notice,

took

prompt

action

to

overrule and void that ruling retroactively by self help.
And despite that ruling the plaintiffs have still refused
to accord any of those member's rights to Bennett.

They

still have refused to pay distributions or give Bennett any
required notice of their attempted manipulation of ME&LS'
core documents.
CONCLUSION
The Order of Judge Boyden confirmed by Judge Brian, the
Order of Judgment of Judge Brian, and the Order to Enforce
Judgment of Judge Dever, should be affirmed.
DATED this J^yU day of

J4<^a^eAx^',

2011.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By:
Reed L. Martineau
Keith A. Call
Derek J. Williams
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
2011,

I caused

\<^

a true and correct

day of

ffj/i/[4y

copy of the

BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed to the following:
Matthew C. Barneck
Paul P. Burghardt
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOdO-McNeil Engineering and Land
Surveying, LLC; McNeil
Engineering, Inc.; and Scott
McNeil,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff, Counterclaim
Defendant, and Appellant,

Case No. 20080319-CA
FILED
(May 21, 2009)
2009 UT App 138

Dale K. Bennett; Benchmark
Engineering and Land
Surveying, LLC; et al.,
Defendant, Counterclaim
Plaintifft and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050917315
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys: Matthew C. Barneck and Paul P. Burghardt, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Reed L. Martineau, Keith A. Call, and Derek J.
Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and f)avis.
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellant McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC (ME&LS)
filed suit against Appellee Dale K. Bennett for various claims,
and Bennett asserted several counterclaims. The parties
eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue
of whether Bennett's employment resignation from McNeil
Engineering, Inc. triggered his withdrawal as a member of ME&LS.
The district court determined that Bennett did not withdraw as a
member of ME&LS and was therefore due his share of disbursements.
ME&LS filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district
court denied. The district court then, on Bennett's motion,
determined there was "no just reason for delaying entry of
judgment as requested by Bennett" for his share of cash
distributions. ME&LS now appeals.
The threshold issue before us is whether we have subject
matter jurisdiction to address the other issues that the parties

raise on appeal, that is, we must first determine whether the
order being appealed from was properly certified for appeal under
rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the
parties assert that this case is properly before us via a rule
54(b) certification, this consensus is not dispositive.
"'Acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction and . . . a lack of jurisdiction can be raised at
any time by either party or by the court. f,f Kennecott Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991) (omission
in original) (quoting Olson v. Salt Lake Citv Sch. Dist., 724
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986)).
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court has further
elaborated on the requirements of certification under rule 54 (b):
First, there must be multiple claims for
relief or multiple parties to the action.
Second, the judgment appealed from must have
been entered on an order that would be
appealable but for the fact that other claims
or parties remain in the action. Third, the
trial court, in its discretion, must make a
determination that there is no just reason
for delay of the appeal.
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
proper certification under rule 54 (b) does not occur when the
district court simply directs that judgment be entered and makes
the order final. See id. at 768. The district court must
additionally determine "whether there was any just reason for
delaying the appeal. If it found none, it would then be free to
enter such a certification, permitting the appeal to proceed."
Id. Neither of these two determinations alone is sufficient for
certification under rule 54 (b):

20080319-CA
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We must emphasize that all of these
requirements must be met. An order that is
"final*1 as to a claim or a party in a multiclaim or multi-party suit is appealable under
Rule 54 (b) only if it is accompanied by a
district court certification that no just
reason exists for delaying the appeal; an
order that does not wholly dispose of a claim
or a party is not "final" under Rule 54(b)
and will not be appealable, even with such a
certification.
Id. (emphasis added).x
The parties argue that the district court properly certified
this case under rule 54(b) because the court's Order and Judgment
stated, "The Court finds that there is no just reason for
delaying entry of judgment as requested by Bennett." Although
this reflects the district court's determination that the Order
was a final order, it is unclear whether the court meant the
Order was a final order for purposes of 54(b).2 Moreover, the
•

•

•

*

•

•

*

'

•

'

- * •

-

-

•

•

•

district courts have been directed to provide findings
supporting both the determination that a judgment is final under
rule 54 (b) and the determination that there is no just reason for
delay of the appeal. See Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137,
139 (Utah 1992) ("In order to facilitate this courtTs review of
judgments certified as final under rule 54(b), trial courts
should henceforth enter findings supporting the conclusion that
such orders are final.")/ id. ("[T]his court has yet to see a
single instance where a trial court has advanced a rationale as
to why there was no just reason for delay. Because this
determination by the trial court is subject to judicial review
under an abuse of discretion standard, a brief explanation should
accompany all future certifications so that this court may render
an informed decision on that question.").
2

Under the facts of this case, that determination would be
inappropriate in any event. The approach adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court "requires that before a claim can be considered
separate, the facts underlying it must be different than those
underlying other claims in the action." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991). Thus, to
determine whether an issue certified for appeal is separate from
the issues remaining in district court, we "focus [] on the degree
of factual overlap between [the issues]. When this factual
overlap is such that separate claims appear to be based on the
same operative facts or on the same operative facts with minor
variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for
(continued...)

20080319-CA
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Order lacks an accompanying determination that there is no just
reason for delay in bringing an appeal. This conclusion is
underscored by the following exchange at the hearing on Bennett's
motion to enforce the prior summary judgment ruling:
[ME&LS's counsel]: And I presume that
order is going to make the--state the
language under Rule 54(b) that it's--there's
an express determination of final judgment.
I think that's what they were Asking for.
[Bennett!s counsel]: Your Honor, we
simply requested a judgment. We didn't
request that it be certifiable so it could be
appealed on an interlocutory basis.
THE COURT: The Court simply granted the
relief prayed for in the motion, and orders
counsel for [Bennett] to so reflect in the
order.
All right, next matter.
[ME&LS's counsel]: I'm sorry, Your
Honor. I have to ask for some clarification,
because I'm at a loss here. [Their] moving
papers did ask for a final judgment, and the
Court is entering a ruling that is, in fact,
a final judgment. You ['re] ordering my
client to make payment by a date certain.
THE COURT: Is counsel not correct?
That was the specific relief that defense
counsel sought, and the specific relief the
Court granted.
[BennettTs counsel]* We sought a
judgment--an order of judgment in that
amount, Your Honor. We did not specifically
request that it be certified as [a] final
order for--as a final judgment for purposes
of appeal. So I don't know what--exactly
2

(. ..continued)
rule 54(b) purposes." Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, where the majority, if not all, of the
issues in this case are related to Bennett's resignation and the
events surrounding it, and where there remains pending an ME&LS
claim that Bennett breached the operating agreement, there is
factual overlap between the claim before us and claims pending in
the district court.

20080319-CA
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what weTre asking for here. We wanted a
judgment that we could collect upon. Your
Honor, has ruled that the payment is to be
made, and-THE COURT: Cite the specific language
in your motion regarding the relief sought,
and that is the order of the Court--whatever
the specific language of your motion reads.
The district court therefore clearly made no determination as to
whether there was any just reason for delaying an appeal but
simply granted Bennett*s motion, which requested only "an order
of judgment for Bennett's share of member distributions."3 Thus,
there was no proper certification under rule 54(b), and we do not
have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in
this appeal.
"When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac,
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We
therefore dismiss the appeal.

James Z. Davis, Judge

WE CONCUR:

William A. Thome Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge
3

Bennett1s motion was devoid of the "no just reason for
delay" language but instead stated, "There is no reason the Court
cannot enter a judgment against ME&LS for this amount and order
that Plaintiffs pay Bennett this amount." Bennett1s supporting
memorandum used language closer to that of rule 54 (b), stating,
"Bennett is entitled to this judgment based upon the Court's
prior ruling and there is no just cause for delaying the entry of
this judgment." Neither filing, however, requested the court to
make a determination that there was no just reason for delaying
an appeal.

20080319-CA
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
McNEiL ENGINEERING, INC., McNEIL
ENGINEERING AND LAND
SURVEYING, LLC, and, SCOTT
McNEIL, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 050917315

BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND
LAND SURVEYING, LLC, BENCHMARK
CAD SERVICES, LAND
DEVEOLOPMENT CADD, INC., DALE K.
BENNETT, an individual, and,
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an
individual,

Judge: L.A. DEVSR

Defendants..
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants' Notice to Submit for
Decision their Motion to Enforce Judgment and Motion for Leave to (1) Serve Third Set
of Interrogatories, (2) File Fourth Request for Production of Documents, and (3) Take
Second 30(b)(6) Deposition, filed July 21,2010. The Court having reviewed
Defendants' Motions and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto, and being duly advised in the
premises of each, makes the following ruling.
Defendants' Motion to Enforce Judgment
Defendants request the Court to enforce the April 3,2008, Order and Judgment

issued by the Honorable Pat Brian. The Order and Judgment entered in favor of
Defendant Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") in the amount of $142,174.93. On April 21,
2008, the parties stipulated a joint motion to stay the pending trial while Plaintiffs
appealed in part, the Court's Order entered December 21, 2006, which ruled that
Bennett is a member of ME&LS and an Order entered April 2, 2008, which denied
reconsideration of the December 21,2006, ruling.
Pursuant to the terms of the April 21, 2008, stipulation Bennett agreed that the
stay of any execution of the Order and Judgment may be entered without the need to
post a supersedeas bond. On May 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiffs'
appeal for failure to show certification of the finality of the trial court's order. A remittitur
was entered on August 10,2009.
Defendants now seek enforcement of the April 3, 2008, Order and Judgment as
the basis for the earlier stipulation no longer apply.
This Courtfindsthe following explanation regarding such matters helpful in its
consideration:
[T]he "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to
prevent injustice. "The purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of
economy of time and efficiency of procedure, It is desirable to avoid the
delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings
upon the same propositions in the same case." Richardson v. Grand
Central Corp.. 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). See Conderv.A. L
Williams &ASS0C8.. Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
"Although a trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, prior
relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be followed."
People ex, rel. Gallagher v. District Court. 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983).
2

The law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the case
in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced.
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc.. 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984);
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.. 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. Gibbons
& Reed Co.. 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104,1105 (Utah 1973).
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v» James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
Upon review of the case, the Order and Judgment issued on April 3,2008, was
intended to serve as the final order on Defendants' counterclaim for declaratory relief.
See e.g. Pasauin v. Pasauin. 1999 UT App 245, f12, 988 P.2d 1 ("In this case, the
October 21 Order was properly certified because it granted summary judgment for all
claims against the Estate* Further, the trial court also made the required finding that
there was 'no just reason for delay/ and expressly ordered the entry of judgment as
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).")
Similarly, Judge Brian's Court found "that there is no just reason for delaying
entry of judgment as requested by Bennett.w The Order and Judgment was entered into
the Registry of Judgments on April 9, 2008.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order and
Judgment, issued and entered on April 3,2008, is a final order on Defendants'
counterclaim for declaratory relief.
Defendants' Motion for Leave
Defendants' seek leave from this Court to continue certain discovery proceedings
because of Plaintiffs1 alleged actions which are contrary to the ruling of the Honorable
3

Ann Boyden. Specifically, while Judge Boyden declared in a ruling issued November
17,2006, that Bennett was entitled to all of the rights of other ME&LS members,
Plaintiffs have allegedly been acting contrary to this ruling by failing to provide Bennett
with information he is claimed to be entitled to including: tax returns, financial
statements, disbursements of any kind to other members, etc.
Defendants fail to present any viable legal argument and analysis to the Court
that would address their claimed entitlement to additional discovery in light of a final
ruling on Bennett's claim for declaratory relief and dismissal of his accounting claim on
January 29,2008.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Leave.
This Ruling serves as the Order of the Court. No further order is required.

Dated 21st day of September, 2010.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated
AA^ day of September,2010, postage prepaid, to the following:

Reed L Martineau
Keith A. Call
Derek J. Williams
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Matthew C. Barneck
Martha Knudson
Paul P. Burghardt
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Wells Fargo Center, 15m Floor
299 South Main Street

P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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MATTHEW C. BARNECK [5249]
PAUL P. BURGHARDT [10795]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
E-Mail: Matthew-Barneck@jbmn.com
Paul-Burghardt@rbmn.com.
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC; McNEIL
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING,
LLC; and SCOTT McNEIL, an individual,

AMENDED ORDER CERTIFYING
ORDER AND JUDGMENT AS FINAL

Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants,
vs.
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND
LAND SURVEYING, LLC; BENCHMARK
CAD SERVICES, LLC; LAND
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC; and
DALE K. BENNETT, an individual;
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an individual,
Defendants and Counter Claimants.

Civil No. 050917315
Judge L.A. Dever

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion to Alter or Amend Order
filed by Plaintiff McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC ("ME&LS") on October 1,2010,
and also the Motion for Certification That The April 3, 2008 Order and Judgment is Final for
Purposes of Rule 54(b) and for Appeal, recentlyfiledby the Defendants. Based on the foregoing, the
Court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:
1.

An Order and Judgment was entered in this case by the Honorable Pat Brian of

the Third District Court for Salt Lake County on April 3,2008.
2.

ME&LS filed a Notice of Appeal on April 8,2008.

3.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on May 25,2009

ruling that the Order and Judgment were notfinalfor purposes of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals specified certain language to be used when the District Court
certifies an order as final. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court must make
a determination that the operative facts underlying the claims to be appealed are separate and distinct
from those on which the remaining claims are based.
4.

This Court issued a Minute Entry on September 21, 2010 finding that the

"Order and Judgment, issued and entered on April 3, 2008, is a final order on Defendants'
counterclaim for declaratory relief." The Minute Entry was intended to be the Order of the Court.
5.

This Order modifies the Minute Entry and is intended to certify the Order and

Judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 54(b),
this Court makes the express direction for entry of afinaljudgment as to one or more but fewer than
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all of the claims or parties in this action. The Court hereby determines that the Order and Judgment
entered April 3,2008 was and is intended to befinalunder Rule 54(b). The Court also determines
that there is no just reason for delaying an appealfromthe Order and Judgment.
6.

This Court also makes the determination that the operative facts underlying

the adjudicated claims are separate and distinctfromthose underlying the claims which remain in the
District Court. The operative facts relating to Bennett's Counterclaim, in this action on which the
Order and Judgment is based, are summarized as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.

7.

The language of the ME&LS Operating Agreement and its
amendments.
The history of ME&LS and its relationship with McNeil
Engineering, Inc. ("MEI").
The voluntary nature of Bennett's resignation.
The payments to members and the changes of ownership in
ME&LS after Bennett's resignation.
By contrast, the claims of the Plaintiffs which remain in the District Court are

based upon a distinctly different set of operative facts, which are summarized as follows:
a.

b.

c.

d.

Bennett's subsequent establishment of a competing
engineering firm, and whether his conduct before and after
departure breached duties to ME&LS or the Operating
Agreement of ME&LS.
Bennett's interactions with the Engcad entities set up to
outsource drafting work to the Philippines, and whether his
conduct interfered with ME&LS' business relationship with
Engcad or breached duties to Engcad.
Bennett's subsequent use of ME&LS' design practices, tools,
and procedures, and whether such conduct is a
misappropriation of trade secrets,
Whether the logo and slogan of Bennett's new company
infringe upon the rights of ME&LS and MEI.
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8.

Based on the foregoing, this Courl certifies the Order and Judgment ofApril 3.

2008 as final for all purposes under Rule 54(b). as described above.
IT IS SO ORDERI-D.
DATKD this _^Jday of October. 2010.
BY Till-COURT:

HOltoRABUiJ^U^VER.
THIRD DIsftfTCT COURTJUDGl:
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SNOW CI IRISTI-NSEN & MARTINr-AU

Attorneys for Dcfemlcmlx
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
day of October, 2010, to the following:
sent byfirst-classmail, postage prepaid, on this
Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Defendants
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